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Evolving Fuzzy Rules for
Relaxed-Criteria Negotiation
Kwang Mong Sim
Abstract—In the literature on automated negotiation, very few
negotiation agents are designed with the flexibility to slightly
relax their negotiation criteria to reach a consensus more rapidly
and with more certainty. Furthermore, these relaxed-criteria
negotiation agents were not equipped with the ability to en-
hance their performance by learning and evolving their relaxed-
criteria negotiation rules. The impetus of this work is designing
market-driven negotiation agents (MDAs) that not only have the
flexibility of relaxing bargaining criteria using fuzzy rules, but can
also evolve their structures by learning new relaxed-criteria fuzzy
rules to improve their negotiation outcomes as they participate
in negotiations in more e-markets. To this end, an evolutionary
algorithm for adapting and evolving relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules
was developed. Implementing the idea in a testbed, two kinds
of experiments for evaluating and comparing EvEMDAs (MDAs
with relaxed-criteria rules that are evolved using the evolutionary
algorithm) and EMDAs (MDAs with relaxed-criteria rules that
are manually constructed) were carried out through stochastic
simulations. Empirical results show that: 1) EvEMDAs generally
outperformed EMDAs in different types of e-markets and 2) the
negotiation outcomes of EvEMDAs generally improved as they
negotiated in more e-markets.
Index Terms—Adaptive agent, automated negotiation, evolu-
tionary algorithm, evolutionary computational economics, fuzzy
decision controller (FDC), intelligent agent, negotiation agent.
I. INTRODUCTION
N EGOTIATION activities are essential in systems involv-ing the interactions of multiple (artificial or human)
agents. In distributed systems, automated negotiation [1] pro-
vides a means for agents to resolve differences and conflicting
goals, and for controlling and managing resources [2]–[6].
Whereas there is a huge literature on bargaining approaches
based on game theory (e.g., [7]–[13]), and automated negoti-
ation for e-commerce (e.g., [14]–[22]), in many of the existing
negotiation agents, the decision to reach an agreement is made
when the current (counter-)proposals of two negotiating agents
coincide. Most of these agents (except for [3], [5], [6], [21],
and [22]) were not designed with the flexibility to slightly
relax their bargaining terms to reach a consensus more rapidly
(and perhaps with more certainty) in the face of intense ne-
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gotiation pressure. In some applications (e.g., grid resource
management [2]–[6]), being more successful in negotiating for
resources more rapidly is a desirable property because any
delay incurring on waiting for resources would be perceived
as an overhead [2]. Sim and Wang’s [21] preliminary work on
relaxed-criteria negotiation enhanced the flexibility of market-
driven agents (MDAs) [18]–[20] (see Section II) by augmenting
them with sets of fuzzy rules that guide these agents in relaxing
their bargaining terms (e.g., proposed trading price) in the
face of (intense) negotiation pressure (e.g., very stiff compe-
tition). Preliminary results in [5], [6], and [21] have shown
that designing negotiation agents with the flexibility to relax
their bargaining terms enhanced their chances of successfully
reaching agreements and perhaps reaching agreements more
rapidly. Nevertheless, even though the designs of negotiation
agents in [5], [6], and [21] were augmented with fuzzy con-
trollers and fuzzy rules, the fuzzy rules in [5], [6], and [21]
were manually constructed, and the system structures of these
negotiation agents remained generally fixed throughout their
operations in different e-markets. Since there are many varying
parameters in an e-market, e.g., there can be different numbers
of participants, different numbers of buyers and sellers, and
different constraints such as different negotiation deadlines, it is
difficult to find a fixed set of fuzzy rules that is suitable for all
e-markets. The impetus of this work is designing and devel-
oping negotiation agents that not only have the flexibility of
relaxing the bargaining criteria using fuzzy rules, but also has
the ability to evolve their structures by learning new relaxed-
criteria fuzzy rules to improve their negotiation outcomes as
they participate in negotiations in more e-markets with un-
predictable market conditions (e.g., agents can enter/leave an
e-market at any time).
The novel features of this work in relaxed-criteria are:
1) formulating a new relaxed-criteria negotiation model
(Section III);
2) specifying an entirely new set of criteria for negotiation
agents to relax their bargaining terms (Section III-B);
3) designing a new fuzzy decision controller (FDC)
(Section III-C) for agents to determine the amount of
relaxation in a negotiation situation by consulting a set
of relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules;
4) designing an evolutionary algorithm (Section IV-A) that
invokes a genetic algorithm (GA) (Section IV-B) for
evolving and adapting the relaxed-criteria rules as the
negotiation agents participate in negotiation activities in
a series of e-markets;
5) designing and implementing a testbed and conduct ex-
perimentations (Section V) using the testbed to evaluate
1083-4419/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE
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the effectiveness of the evolutionary algorithm in 4) for
evolving relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules.
Section VI compares this paper with existing negotiation
agents that are designed with the flexibility to relax their trading
conditions using fuzzy approaches. Section VII concludes this
paper by summarizing a list of contributions and future works.
II. MARKET-DRIVEN NEGOTIATION AGENT
An MDA is an e-negotiation agent that determines the appro-
priate amounts of concessions using three negotiation decision
functions: time (T ), competition (C), and opportunity (O)
[18]–[20]. It makes concessions by narrowing the difference kt
between its proposal in a negotiation round t and its reserve
price (RP). In determining the appropriate amounts of conces-
sions, Sim has shown in [18] and [19] that an MDA should
adopt the opportunity, competition, and time decision functions
to determine the expected difference kt+1 between its proposal
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Since an MDA makes concession by narrowing kt in the next
round, kt+1 is a fraction of kt. Let Pt be the proposal of an
MDA at round t. An MDA that is a seller generates its proposal
in round t + 1 by decrementing its price as follows:
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where kt = Pt − RP.
An MDA that is a buyer generates its proposal in round t + 1
by incrementing its price as follows:
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where kt = RP − Pt.





t −wSj→Bt )/(vB→Sjt −cB))
determines the amount of concession based on 1) trading
alternatives (i.e., outside options or number of trading parties
nBt ) and 2) differences in utilities generated by the proposal
of an MDA (vB→Sjt ) and the counterproposal(s) of its trading
party(parties) (〈wSj→Bt 〉 = {wS1→Bt , wS2→Bt , . . . , wSj→Bt })
[18]–[20]. cB is the worst possible utility for agent B.
When negotiation ends in a conflict (i.e., B fails to reach an
agreement with its trading parties), B obtains its worst outcome
cB . Whereas vB→Sjt − wSj→Bt measures the cost of accepting
a trading party’s (S ′js) last offer (i.e., difference between the
(counter-)proposals of B and Sj), vB→Sjt − cB measures the
cost of provoking a conflict. When determining opportunity,
it was shown in [18] and [19] that if there is a large number
of trading alternatives, the likelihood that an agent proposes a
bid/offer that is potentially close to an MDA’s offer/bid may
be high. However, it would be difficult for the MDA to reach
a consensus if none of the so many options are viable (i.e.,
there are large differences between the proposal of an MDA
and the counterproposals of all its trading parties). On this
account, the O function determines the probability of reaching
a consensus on its own terms by determining its bargaining
position based on 1) trading alternatives and 2) differences
between its proposal and proposals of other agents. The general
idea is that if the probability of reaching a consensus on its own
terms is high (respectively, low), an MDA will make a smaller
(respectively, larger) amount of concession.
2) Competition Function: C(mBt , nBt ) determines the
amount of competition of an MDA by determining the
probability that it is not being considered as the most preferred
trading party. Since MDAs are utility maximizing agents, an
MDA is more likely to reach a consensus if its proposal is
ranked the highest by some other agent. Suppose an agent
B1 has mBt − 1 competitors {B2, . . . , Bm} and nBt trading
parties {S1, . . . , Sn}. The probability that B1 is not the most
preferred trading party of any Sj (where Sj ∈ {S1, . . . , Sn}) is
(mBt − 1)/mBt . Hence, the probability that B1 is not the most
preferred party of all Sj ∈ {S1, . . . , Sn} is [(mBt − 1)/mBt ]nBt .
Hence, the probability that B1 is considered the most preferred
trading party by at least one of Sj ∈ {S1, . . . , Sn} is as
follows: C(mBt , nBt ) = 1− [(mBt − 1)/mBt ]nBt , where mBt
and nBt are the numbers of buyer agents (including B1) and
seller agents at round t, respectively. The general ideas of
C(mBt , n
B
t ) are the following: 1) the probability of being
considered the most preferred trading party by some parties
increases with the number of trading parties nBt and 2) with
a larger number of competitors mBt , the likelihood of being
considered the most preferred trading party decreases. If the
probability of being the most preferred trading party is high
(respectively, low), an MDA will make a smaller (respectively,
larger) amount of concession.
3) Time Function: The time-dependent function T (t, τ, λ)
models the intuition that as time passes, an MDA relaxes its
proposal by attempting to narrow kt using: T (t, τ, λ) = 1−
(t/τ)λ, where t is the current trading time, τ is the deadline, and
λ is an MDA’s time preference. Negotiators with different time
preferences may adopt different concession rates with respect
to time. The concession rate is determined with respect to 0 <
λ < ∞. With infinitely many values of λ, there are infinitely
many possible strategies in making concession with respect
to remaining trading time. However, they are classified in
[18]–[20] as follows.
1) Linear: λ = 1 and Pt+1=Pt−[1−T (t, τ, λ)]kt = Pt −
(t/τ)kt (respectively, Pt+1=Pt + [1− T (t, τ, λ)]kt =
Pt + (t/τ)kt) for seller (respectively, buyer). At any
round t, an MDA makes a constant rate of conces-
sion, Δt = |Pt − Pt+1| = (t/τ)kt. At the deadline t =
τ , Δt = (τ/τ)kt = kt (an MDA attempts to narrow
the difference completely at the deadline), and for a
seller (respectively, buyer) Pt+1 = Pt − (τ/τ)kt = RP
(respectively, Pt+1 = Pt + (τ/τ)kt = RP) (an MDA
proposes RP at its deadline).
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2) Conciliatory: 0<λ<1 and Pt+1=Pt−(t/τ)λkt (re-
spectively, Pt+1 = Pt + (t/τ)λkt) for seller (respec-
tively, buyer). An MDA makes larger concessions in the
early trading rounds and smaller concessions at the later
stage.
3) Conservative: 1 < λ <∝ and Pt+1 = Pt − (t/τ)λkt
(respectively, Pt+1 = Pt + (t/τ)λkt) for seller (respec-
tively, buyer). An MDA makes smaller concessions in
early rounds and larger concessions in later rounds.
III. RELAXED-CRITERIA NEGOTIATION MODEL
In the alternating offers protocol and also in most negotiation
models (e.g., [7]–[17], only to name a few because of space
limitation), a pair of negotiation agents (B1, S1) reaches an
agreement when one agent proposes a deal that matches (or
exceeds) what another agent asks for. The negotiation protocol
in [3], [5], [6], and [21] enhances the alternating offers pro-
tocol [10] by slightly relaxing the criteria for agents to reach
a consensus. The relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol in this
work is given in Section III-A. Relaxation of negotiation criteria
(Section III-B) is achieved by augmenting negotiation agents
with an FDC (Section III-C).
A. Relaxed-Criteria Negotiation Protocol
Following [3], [5], [6], and [21], the negotiation activities
among buyer agents and seller agents are specified as follows.
1) Negotiation proceeds in a series of rounds.
2) Adopting Rubinstein’s alternating offers protocol
[10, p. 100], a pair of buyer and seller agents negotiates
by making proposals in alternate rounds.
3) Multiple buyer–seller agent pairs can negotiate deals
simultaneously.
4) When an agent makes a proposal, it proposes a deal from
its space of possible deals (e.g., consisting of the most
desirable price, the least desirable (reserve) price, and
those prices in between). Typically, an agent proposes its
most preferred deal initially [23].
5) If no agreement is reached, negotiation proceeds to the
next round. At every round, an agent determines its
amount of concession using the T , O, and C functions
[18]–[20] (see Section II).
6) Negotiation between two agents terminates 1) when an
agreement is reached or 2) with a conflict when one of
the bargaining agents’ deadline is reached.
7) Agents follow one of the following rules for reaching an
agreement.
R1) An agreement is reached if an agent B1 and its trading
party S1 propose deals b1 and o1, respectively, such that
either 1) U(b1) ≥ U(o1) or 2) U(o1) ≥ U(b1), where b1
and o1 represent the buying and selling prices and U is a
utility function.
R2) An agreement is reached if either 1) η = U(o1)− U(b1),
such that η → 0 or 2) η = U(b1)− U(o1), such that
η → 0, where η is the amount of relaxation determined
using an FDC described in Section III-C (details can be
found in [5], [6], and [21]).
B. Relaxation Criteria
Whereas, agents in [21] use eagerness and degree of com-
petition to determine the amounts of relaxation of the negoti-
ation conditions, this work considers three relaxation criteria:
1) degree of competition (ϑ); 2) time pressure (Tr); and 3) the
relative distances from trading parties’ proposals (δ).
1) Degree of Competition: ϑ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree
of competition that an agent faces at round t. An agent deter-
mines its degree of competition at round t by considering the
number of its competitors and the number of its trading parties
as follows:
ϑ = [(mat − 1) /mat ]n
a
t
where mat − 1 is the number of the agents’ competitors at
round t, and nat is the number of the agent’s trading parties
at round t. With a higher (respectively, lower) value of ϑ, an
agent faces more (respectively, less) competition, and is more
(respectively, less) likely to relax its bargaining criteria to reach
an agreement.
2) Time Pressure: Let Tr ∈ [0, 1] represents an agent’s time
pressure. An agent determines its time pressure as follows.
Tr = t/τ , where τ is the agent’s deadline and t is the time in-
dex. When an agent’s deadline is fast approaching (i.e., Tr→1),
it is under more pressure to relax its bargaining criteria.
3) Distances From Trading Parties’ Proposals: Another cri-
terion for relaxation is the relative distances between the pro-
posal of an agent and all the proposals of its trading parties.
The general idea is that if the best proposal from an agent’s
trading party is very close to its own proposal relative to all
other proposals from all other trading parties, then it seems
prudent that an agent should relax its bargaining terms and
reach a consensus with the trading party with the best proposal.
Let δ ∈ [0, 1] represents relative distances between the proposal
of an agent and all the proposals of its trading parties. At each















where dit denotes the distance between an agent’s proposal
and its ith trading party’s proposal at round t, dbestt =
min(d1t , d
2
t , . . . , d
nat
t ), and nat is the number of the agent’s
trading parties at round t. A high value of δ indicates that the
best proposal from its trading parties is very close to an agent’s
proposal relative to all other proposals from all other trading
parties.
Factors such as degree of competition, time pressure, and
distances from trading parties generally place an agent under
pressure. When an agent is under (intense) pressure (e.g.,
when it is facing stiff competition, or when its deadline is
fast approaching, or when its own proposal is relatively close
to a trading party’s proposal and relatively far from all other
proposals of its trading parties, it is more likely to relax its
negotiation criteria to enhance its probability of successfully
reaching agreements and perhaps reaching agreements more
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TABLE I
MANUALLY DESIGNED FUZZY RULES
rapidly. Since notions such as “stiff” competition, and “fast”
approaching deadline, and relatively “close” to or “far” from a
trading party’ proposal are vague, it is prudent to use fuzzy sets
to represent these concepts, and to design an FDC for guiding
agents’ decisions for relaxing the negotiation conditions.
C. Fuzzy Decision Controller
The FDC has three inputs (ϑ, Tr, and δ) and one output η
(degree of relaxation), and it consults a set of fuzzy rules (see
Table I for an example of a set of relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules).
It consists of a fuzzification interface (FI), a fuzzy rule base
(RB), a fuzzy negotiation decision-making logic (DML), and
a defuzzification interface (DFI).
1) Fuzzification: The FI converts the (crisp) input data to
the FDC (ϑ, Tr, and δ) into linguistic values (or labels of
fuzzy sets). Based on the range of possible values of a variable,
several fuzzy sets (i.e., Lϑ, Mϑ, Hϑ; LTr , MTr , HTr ; and Lδ ,
Mδ , Hδ) are defined. That is, each variable has three fuzzy
values: L, M , and H . For example, for ϑ, the fuzzy set Lϑ
corresponds to the range between ϑ = 0 and ϑ = 1/2. Some
examples of linguistic values of the variables ϑ, Tr, and δ are
“stiff competition” (represented as H in Table I), “high time
pressure,” and “relatively close to a trading party’s proposal,”
respectively. A membership function μ(x) is used for assigning
the membership degree of each crisp value of a variable in the
fuzzy sets [24]. The following membership functions are used




−2x + 1, x ∈ [0, 1/2]
p1(2x) + (1− p1)(−2x + 1), x ∈ [0, 1]
2x− 1, x ∈ [1/2, 1]
where p1 = 1 when x ∈ [0, 1/2], and p1 = 0 when x ∈
[1/2, 1]. For example, a crisp value ϑ = 0.2 may be “fuzzified”
as a member of L with a membership degree of 0.6, and as a
member of M with a membership degree of 0.4 (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Linguistic terms of the membership function.
2) Fuzzy Decision Making: By consulting the fuzzy rules
(see Table I) in RB, the DML infers the linguistic value of
η and its corresponding membership degree μ(η) from the
linguistic values and membership degrees of the fuzzified
inputs ϑ, Tr, and δ. For example, suppose that ϑ is a member
of M with μ(ϑ) = 0.38 and a member of H with μ(ϑ) = 0.62,
and Tr is a member of L with μ(Tr) = 0.88 and a member
of M with μ(Tr) = 0.12, and δ is a member of M with
μ(δ) = 0.44 and a member of H with μ(δ) = 0.56. Guided by
rules 11, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, and 24 in Table I (chosen based
on the combination of the linguistic values of ϑ, Tr, and δ),
the DML infers that η is a member of L with μ(η) = 0.39
and a member of M with μ(η) = 0.54 and a member of
H with μ(η) = 0.07. The membership of η for a linguistic
value is determined by μ(η) =
∑
μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ). For
instance, by rule 11, if ϑ is a member of M with μ(ϑ) = 0.38,
and Tr is a member of L with μ(Tr) = 0.88, and δ is a
member of M with μ(δ) = 0.44, then η is a member of L with
μ(η) = μ(ϑ) × μ(Tr)× μ(δ) = 0.38× 0.88× 0.44 = 0.15.
Similarly, by rule 12, η is a member of M with
μ(η) = μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ) = 0.38× 0.88 × 0.56 = 0.19.
By rule 14, η is a member of M with μ(η) =
μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ) = 0.38× 0.12× 0.44 = 0.02. By rule
15, η is a member of H with μ(η) = μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ) =
0.38× 0.12× 0.56 = 0.03. By rule 20, η is a member
of L with μ(η) = μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ) = 0.62× 0.88×
0.44 = 0.24. By rule 21, η is a member of M with
μ(η) = μ(ϑ)× μ(Tr)× μ(δ) = 0.62× 0.88 × 0.56 = 0.30.
By rule 23, η is a member of M with μ(η) =
0.62× 0.12× 0.44 = 0.03. By rule 24, η is a member of
H with μ(η) = 0.62× 0.12× 0.56 = 0.04. Hence, by rules 11
and 20, η is a member of L with μ(η) = 0.15 + 0.24 = 0.39.
By rules 12, 14, 21, and 23, η is a member of M with
μ(η) = 0.19 + 0.02 + 0.30 + 0.03 = 0.54. By rules 15 and 24,
η is a member of H with μ(η) = 0.03 + 0.04 = 0.07.
3) Defuzzification: The DFI is used to determine the crisp
value of η given its linguistic values with their respective mem-
bership degrees being obtained from the DML. To compute
the crisp value of η, the DFI in this work adopts the weighted
average method [25]. For example, given that η is a member of
L with μ(η) = 0.8 and a member of M with μ(η) = 0.2 which
are obtained from the DML, DFI is used to determine a single
crisp value of η as follows:
η = (0.8× 0 + 0.2× (1/2)) /(0.8 + 0.2) = 0.1.
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Fig. 2. Procedure for evolving relaxed-criteria rules.
Consequently, the crisp value of η is used to determine if an
agent’s trading party’s proposal is sufficiently close to its own,
so that an agreement can be reached following the relaxed-
criteria protocol described in Section III-A.
IV. EVOLVING RELAXED-CRITERIA RULES
Whereas negotiation agents described in [3], [5], [6], and
[21] are designed to reach agreements with more flexibility,
the relaxed-criteria rules are manually constructed. This sec-
tion describes an approach in which relaxed-criteria rules of
MDAs are evolved as they negotiate in a series of different e-
markets. In this work, an evolutionary procedure (Section IV-A)
is proposed for learning effective relaxed-criteria negotiation
rules that would enhance the performance of MDAs in terms of
success rates in negotiation, expected utility, negotiation speed,
and combined negotiation outcomes. Using the negotiation out-
comes of agents in each e-market as data sets, at the termination
of the negotiation process for each e-market, a GA (Section IV-B)
is executed to evolve a new set of (fuzzy) relaxed-criteria rules
of MDAs.
A. Algorithm for Evolving Fuzzy Rules
An evolutionary procedure (see Fig. 2) is designed to im-
prove the negotiation performance of MDAs by evolving their
relaxed-criteria (fuzzy) rule sets as they negotiate in a series
of different e-markets {M0,M1, . . .}. Initially, a set R0 of 27
manually designed fuzzy rules is generated (see Table I). Dur-
ing the negotiation process in e-market M0, MDAs adopt R0 as
their relaxed-criteria rule sets in their FDCs for determining if
agreements should be reached. When the negotiation process of
M0 terminates, the crisp values of ϑ, Tr, δ, and η of MDAs that
have successfully reached agreements are recorded as a data
set D0. Subsequently, using both D0 and R0 as inputs, the GA
in Section IV-B is invoked to evolve a set of new fuzzy rules.
The set of newly evolved fuzzy rules replaces some of the rules
Fig. 3. GA for evolving relaxed-criteria rules.
in R0 to form a new rule set R1. The process continues such
that at each Mi: 1) MDAs adopt Ri as their relaxed-criteria
rule sets; 2) when the negotiation process of Mi terminates, the
crisp values of ϑ, Tr, δ, and η of MDAs that have successfully
reached agreements are recorded as a data set Di; and 3) using
both Di and Ri as inputs, the GA in Section IV-B is invoked
to evolve a new set of fuzzy rules which replace some of the
rules in Ri to form a new rule set Ri+1 which will be adopted
by MDAs in Mi+1.
B. Genetic Algorithm
This section describes the GA (see Fig. 3) used for evolv-
ing relaxed-criteria (fuzzy) rules, including the encoding and
decoding methods, the fitness function, and the genetic
operators. Accepting two inputs: 1) a rule set Ri and 2) a data
set Di, the GA outputs a set of newly evolved relaxed-criteria
rules. Whereas, Ri is used for initializing the population in the
GA, Di is used for calculating the fitness of each individual.
The details are illustrated as follows.
1) Encoding Relaxed-Criteria Rules as Genes: In this work,
relaxed-criteria rules are encoded as strings with fixed length
(individuals). Each string, which consists of “m1m2m3m4”
is an abstract representation of a fuzzy rule (relaxed-criteria
rule), where m1, m2, and m3 represent the antecedents and m4
represents the conclusion of a fuzzy rule. The value domain for
each variable in the antecedent and conclusion of a fuzzy rule is
{0, 1, 2, 3}. Whereas “1,” “2,” and “3” are used to represent the
fuzzy values “L,” “M ,” and “H ,” respectively, “0” represents
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that the corresponding variable does not appear in the fuzzy
rule. Hence, each string may encode several different rules. For
example, string “1232” represents the rule “IF ϑ is L AND Tr
is M AND δ is H , THEN η is M ,” string “0111” represents “IF
Tr is L AND δ is L, THEN η is L,” regardless of the value of
ϑ. Thus, string “0111” potentially encodes three different rules.
2) Decoding Genes to Relaxed-Criteria Rules: Each string
can be decoded to one or several relaxed-criteria rules con-
taining three variables in the antecedent and one variable in
the conclusion. Since “0” in a string represents that the corre-
sponding variable does not appear in a fuzzy rule, the variable
can be mapped into any value in the domain. For example,
whereas string “0121” can be translated into three different
rules corresponding to “1121,” “2121,” and “3121,” string
“0101”can be translated into nine different rules.
3) Fitness Function: In this paper, the fitness of each indi-






The symbols are described as follows. A data record is positive
(P ) if it is covered by m, and it is negative (N) if it is not
covered by m. If a data record is predicted to be P (i.e., the
antecedent is covered by m, and it is predicted that m also
covers the conclusion) and the outcome is actually P (i.e., the
conclusion is actually covered by m), then it is called a true
positive [26]. However, if the conclusion is actually N (i.e., the
conclusion is actually not covered by m), then it is called a false
positive. Conversely, a true negative occurs when a data record
is predicted to be N (i.e., the antecedent is not covered by m,
and it is predicted that the conclusion is also not covered by
m) and the outcome is actually N (i.e., the actual conclusion is
not covered by m). A false negative occurs when a data record
is predicted to be N but the outcome is actually P . Hence,
TP (true positives) [26] is the number of data records that
are covered by the antecedent and conclusion of m. FP (false
positives) [26] is the number of data records that are covered by
the antecedent but not the conclusion of m. TN (true negatives)
[26] is the number of records that are not covered by both the
antecedent and conclusion of m. FN (false negatives) [26] is the
number of records that are covered by m’s conclusion but not
its antecedent.
In this work, a data record d is covered by individual m if it
satisfies the following.
CR1) If min{μm1(d1), μm2(d2), μm3(d3)} ≥ ε, then it is
considered that data record d is covered by the an-
tecedent of individual m (if mi = 0, then μmi(di)
is ignored and deleted from the formula min{μm1(d1),
μm2(d2), μm3(d3)}, i = 1, 2, 3);
CR2) If μm4(d4) ≥ ε, then it is considered that data record d
is covered by the conclusion of individual m.
d1, d2, d3, and d4 represent ϑ, Tr, δ, and η, respectively,
μmi(di) denotes the membership degree of the ith variable if
its crisp value is di and its linguistic value is represented by
mi(i = 1, 2, 3, 4), and ε is set to be 0.5. For instance, suppose
that data record d = {0.2, 0.4, 0.1, 0.05} and individual m =
“1211". String “1211” represents the rule “IF ϑ is L AND
Tr is M AND δ is L, THEN η is L.” Then, μm1(d1) =
μ1(0.2)=μL(0.2)=0.6, μm2(d2)=μ2(0.4)=μM (0.2)=0.8,
μm3(d3) = μ1(0.1) = 0.8, and μm4(d4) = μ1(0.05) = 0.9.
According to (CR1), min{μm1(d1), μm2(d2), μm3(d3)} =
0.6 > ε, hence, d is covered by the antecedent of m. Accord-
ing to (CR2), μm4(d4) = 0.9 > ε, hence d is covered by the
conclusion of m. For another individual z = “1212" which
represents the rule “IF ϑ is L AND Tr is M AND δ is L,
THEN η is M ,” d is also covered by the antecedent of z, but not
covered by the conclusion of z, because μz4(d4) = μ2(0.05) =
μM (0.05) = 0.1 < ε.
4) GA: Details of the GA are given as follows.
1) Generation of the initial population (steps 3–5 in Fig. 3).
The size of each population is denoted as POPSIZE. All
the rules in Ri are copied into the initial population as part
of the individuals. Additionally, other new individuals are
randomly generated, with the values for each variable
randomly generated from the value domain.
2) Fitness calculation (step 6 in Fig. 3). When a new pop-
ulation is generated, the fitness of each individual is
computed from data Di.
3) Crossover operator (step 7(b) in Fig. 3). Two individuals
are chosen for crossover according to a crossover proba-
bility (pc). If a randomly generated decimal is lower than
or equal to pc, crossover will be conducted between these
two individuals. For crossover between two individuals, a
crossover position is randomly picked, and the segments
of the two individuals after the crossover position are
swapped. For example, for two individuals “1111” and
“2222” that are selected for crossover, if the first position
is picked, the two offspring generated by crossover are
“2111” and “1222,” respectively.
4) Mutation operator (step 7(d) in Fig. 3). To apply mutation
on an individual, a position is randomly picked and the
value in the selected position is randomly altered to an-
other value in the domain. For example, for an individual
“1232,” if the third position is picked, and a value “0” is
randomly generated, then the offspring after mutation is
“1202.”
5) Repair operator (step 7(c) in Fig. 3). Since “0” may
appear in individuals, an individual containing all “0”s
in the positions represents a null rule and is invalid.
Therefore, it is necessary to verify each individual. For
an individual to represent a valid rule, there should be at
least one nonzero value in the antecedent, and a nonzero
value in the conclusion. A repair operator [27] is used
to modify invalid individuals. If all the values in the
antecedent are 0, a nonzero value in the domain will be
randomly introduced to a randomly picked position. If
the value in the conclusion is 0, it will be modified to a
random nonzero value in {1, 2, 3}. Although this work
and [27] apply GA with a repair operator to different
problems, this work adopts the same principle as in [27].
In this work, the repair operator consists of 1) validating
the antecedent and conclusion of an individual in the
populations of rules and 2) correcting (repairing) the
antecedent and/or conclusion of the rules. These tasks
1492 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART B: CYBERNETICS, VOL. 38, NO. 6, DECEMBER 2008
correspond to the fault detection and fault correction
tasks, respectively, in [27]. In the validation of an-
tecedents and conclusion of rules, the detection of an
invalid rule triggers the application of the correction or
repair of the rule. As noted in [27], doing so increases
the number of generated individuals that form part of
the valid search space (i.e., decreases the number of
generated individuals that form part of the invalid search
space), and including the repair operator in the GA is
likely to increase its efficiency because empirical results
in [27] showed that when their GA is implemented with
the repair operator, it converged on the better solutions
significantly faster than one without the repair operator.
6) Tournament selection method (step 7(g) in Fig. 3). In each
selection, q individuals are picked from the population
randomly. The individual with the highest fitness among
the q individuals will be selected to be placed into the
new population. The selection process will be repeated
POPSIZE times.
7) Stopping criteria. Although a stopping criteria of 500
iterations is set for the GA presented in Fig. 3, experimen-
tal tuning has demonstrated that it generally converges
rapidly, i.e., before 500 iterations is reached.
8) Parameter settings. Based on experimental tuning, the
size of the population POPSIZE is set to 100, a tourna-
ment size of 7 is used, and the probabilities of crossover
and mutation are 0.8 and 0.2, respectively
V. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTS
A series of experiments was carried out using the testbed
described below. Two kinds of experiments for evaluating and
comparing EvEMDAs (MDAs with relaxed-criteria rules that
are evolved using the evolutionary algorithm in Section IV) and
EMDAs (MDAs with relaxed-criteria rules that are manually
constructed) were carried out through stochastic simulations.
1) Testbed: To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proce-
dure for evolving relaxed-criteria rules (Section IV), a testbed
to simulate the negotiation activities of both EvEMDAs and
EMDAs in a series of e-markets has been developed. Imple-
mented using C++, the testbed consists of an e-market place, a
controller, and negotiation agents.
a) Controller: The controller generates negotiation agents,
randomly assign values for their parameters (e.g., their
roles as buyers or sellers, initial prices, reserve prices,
deadlines, and λ), and simulates the entrance of agents
to the e-marketplace following a uniform distribution.
b) e-market place: In an e-market, negotiation agents are
either buyer agents {B1, B2, . . . , Bm} or seller agents
{S1, S2, . . . , Sn}. In each round, each Bi or Sj performs
the following: a) decides whether to accept its trading
parties’ proposals following rules R1 and R2 specified in
Section III-A, and b) if an agreement is reached, it leaves
the e-market; otherwise, it generates its next proposal
Pt+1 following the specifications in Section II. For the
purpose of simulation, a negotiation agent is either an





2) Objectives and Motivations: The two kinds of experi-
ments are designed to explore the influence of market dynamics
on the performance of EvEMDAs and EMDAs in a series of
e-markets. By comparing EvEMDAs with EMDAs, one can
study the possible benefits of allowing EvEMDAs to have the
flexibility of evolving their relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules to adapt
to different trading environments and to improve their perfor-
mance. By simulating the negotiation activities of EvEMDAs
(and also EMDAs) in a series of e-markets, one can study the
potential self-improving property of EvEMDAs.
In the first (respectively, second) type of experiments, buyer
agents are EvEMDAs (respectively, EMDAs) and seller agents
are MDAs. The reason that seller agents are MDAs is explicated
as follows. The MDA strategy, FDC, and relaxed-criteria rules
are all designed for both buyer and seller agents; hence, without
loss of generality, it suffices to demonstrate the properties of
EvEMDAs from the perspective of buyer agents. The experi-
mental setting used here is based on a common assumption
in microeconomics, namely ceteris paribus [28]. By making
a ceteris paribus assumption, the effect of a particular factor
can be analyzed by holding all other factors constant. Since
the purpose is to only compare EvEMDAs and EMDAs from
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Fig. 4. Buyer–seller ratio 10 : 1.
the perspective of buyer agents, it seems prudent to avoid any
possible influence on the negotiation outcomes when seller
agents make relaxations. Hence, in both types of experiments,
seller agents are programmed as MDAs because MDAs are not
designed to relax their bargaining criteria.
3) Experimental Settings: To demonstrate the self-
improving property of EvEMDAs, the negotiation activities
of EvEMDAs (and EMDAs) are simulated in a series of 100
e-markets. Whereas the same set of fuzzy rules for EMDAs is
used throughout the entire series of 100 markets, the procedure
in Section IV is used to evolve the set of fuzzy rules of
EvEMDAs in between two e-markets. As shown in Table II,
there are three input parameters to the testbed i.e., the e-market
type, negotiation deadline, and strategy λ.
There are three types of e-markets: favorable, balanced, and
unfavorable, and they are characterized by the ratio of buyer to
seller agents. In each experiment, after every ten rounds, there
is a 0.5 probability of generating an agent, and the probability
Pbuyer of the newly generated agent being a buyer (see Table II)
determines the e-market type. From a buyer agent’s perspective,
for a favorable (respectively, an unfavorable) e-market, an agent
enters an e-market with a lower (respectively, higher) Pbuyer
and a higher (respectively, lower) probability of being a seller
agent. Hence, in a favorable (respectively, an unfavorable) e-
market, there is little (respectively, stiff) competition among
buyer agents as there are more (respectively, fewer) sellers.
In an (almost) balanced e-market, the ratio is simply 1 : 1
since there are (almost) equal number of buyers and sellers.
In this paper, experiments are conducted for buyer–seller ratios
{10 : 1, 5 : 1, 1 : 1, 1 : 5}. Buyer–seller ratios such as 1 : 10
and 1 : 100 are not considered since the FDC and the relaxed-
criteria rules are generally designed such that they are unlikely
to be triggered in extremely favorable (or very favorable) e-
markets. In extremely favorable (or very favorable) e-markets,
there is a very high chance that an EvEMDA (respectively,
EMDA) will face little or no competition. Furthermore, with
plenty of trading parties, there is also much higher chance that
an agent will receive proposals from trading parties that are
matching or even exceeding its own proposal. Whereas the
experiments were carried out in (very) unfavorable e-markets
(e.g., buyer–seller ratios such as 10 : 1 and 5 : 1), extremely
unfavorable e-markets (e.g., buyer–seller ratio such as 100 : 1
and 1000 : 1) are not considered. This is because it was noted in
[21] that in extremely unfavorable trading environments, only
at most one pair of buyer and seller can complete the deal, and
the probability that an agent successfully completing a deal is
inherently extremely low even if it relaxes its bargaining terms.
For instance, for a 100 : 1 buyer–seller ratio, at any round, there
is only a probability of 1/100 that a buyer can complete a deal,
if there is at least one seller agent in the market.
For simulation purpose, an agent’s deadline for completing
a task is measured in number of rounds (time units). An
agent’s deadline is randomly generated from between 30 and
100 time units. From experimental tuning, it was found that:
1) for deadlines < 30, very few agents can complete deals, and
2) for deadlines >100, there is plenty of time for trading and
both EvEMDAs and EMDAs achieved very high success rates
in reaching agreements (i.e., both EvEMDAs and EMDAs are
generally not subject to much time pressure).
Whereas strategy λ is randomly picked from {1/10, 1/3, 1,
2, 3, 10}, and for simulation purpose an agent’s proposals are
made in the price range [10, 100].
4) Performance Measure: In the experimentation, 1) Suc-
cess Rate, 2) Expected Utility, 3) Negotiation Speed, and
4) Combined Negotiation Outcome were used as performance
measures for evaluating and comparing EvEMDAs and EMDAs
in the 100 e-markets. These performance measures are defined
in Table III.
5) Simulations: In the first set of simulations, EvEMDAs
(buyer agents) adopting different values of λ are subject
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Fig. 5. Buyer–seller ratio 5 : 1.
Fig. 6. Buyer–seller ratio 1 : 1.
to different deadlines and degrees of competition (different
buyer–seller ratios) in 100 consecutive e-markets. In the second
set of simulations, EMDAs (buyer agents) adopting different
values of λ are subject to the same settings. In both sets of
simulations, the performance of EvEMDAs and EMDAs in 100
consecutive e-markets is recorded and the results are plotted in
Figs. 4–8.
6) Results: Empirical results were obtained for all
representative combinations of the input data (i.e., deadline =
{ 30−39, 40−49, 50−59, 60−69, 70−79, 80−89, 90−100 },
buyer-seller ratio={10 : 1, 5 : 1, 1 : 1, 1 : 5 }, both EvEMDAs
and EMDAs adopting λ = {1/10, 1/3, 1, 2, 3, 10}) in 100
consecutive e-markets. Due to space limitation, only the
average performance of EvEMDAs and EMDAs in the first
ten e-markets (markets 1–10), the middle ten e-markets
(markets 51–60), and the last ten e-markets (markets 91–100)
are plotted. For the four buyer–seller ratios {10 : 1, 5 :
1, 1 : 1, 1 : 5}, SR, EU, NS, and CO were plotted for
the first, middle, and last ten e-markets for deadline =
{ 30−39, 40−49, 50−59, 60−69, 70−79, 80−89, 90−100 }.
Space limitation precludes having all the results being
presented here. Whereas Figs. 4–7 show the performance
of EvEMDAs in the first, middle, and last ten e-markets for
buyer–seller ratios {10 : 1, 5 : 1, 1 : 1, 1 : 5}, Fig. 8 shows
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Fig. 7. Buyer–seller ratio 1 : 5.
the performance of EvEMDAs and EMDAs in the first and last
ten e-markets for buyer–seller ratio 5 : 1. Results comparing
EvEMDAs and EMDAs for {10 : 1, 1 : 1, 1 : 5} are similar
to those of 5 : 1 and are omitted due to space limitation. In
Figs. 4–7, the curves “EvEMDA-1-10,” “EvEMDA-51-60,” and
“EvEMDA-91-100,” respectively, represent the performance
of EvEMDAs in the first, middle, and last ten e-markets.
In Fig. 8, the curves “EvEMDA-1-10” (“EMDA-1-10”)
and “EvEMDA-91-100” (“EMDA-91-100”) represent the
corresponding performance of EvEMDAs (EMDAs) in the first
and last ten e-markets.
7) Observation 1: It can be observed that the performance
of EvEMDAs generally improved as they participated in the
negotiations in more e-markets.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of EvEMDAs in very unfa-
vorable e-markets (buyer–seller ratio 10 : 1). In Fig. 4, for the
first ten e-markets (see “EvEMDAs-1-10”), the performance of
EvEMDAs is modest and NS fluctuated around 2.2 negotiation
rounds. However, NS stabilized in the middle and last ten
e-markets. This is because in the first several e-markets, some
of the manually designed rules were mainly used by EvEMDAs
for relaxing their criteria. However, as EvEMDAs negotiated in
more e-markets, new fuzzy rules were evolved, and it can be
observed that both “EvEMDA-51-60” and “EvEMDA-91-100”
clearly had higher SR, EU, and CO than “EvEMDA-1-10.” Con-
sequently, it can be observed that the performance of EvEMDAs
improved significantly as they negotiated in more unfavorable
e-markets.
From Fig. 5 (buyer–seller ratio 5 : 1), it is observed that in
an unfavorable e-market EvEMDAs achieved higher SR, EU,
and CO, and faster NS in “EvEMDA-51-60” and “EvEMDA-91-
100” than in “EvEMDA-1-10.”
From Fig. 6 (buyer–seller ratio 1 : 1), it is observed that for
a balanced e-market, SR and EU of EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-
51-60” were slightly higher than those in “EvEMDA-1-10.”
However, as EvEMDAs negotiated in more e-markets, it can
be seen that SR and EU of EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-91-
100” improved significantly as compared to the SR and EU
of EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-51-60.” From Fig. 6(d), it can
be observed that the CO of EvEMDAs clearly improved for
every deadline range as they negotiated in more e-markets.
This result clearly shows the self-improvement property of
EvEMDAs.
From Fig. 7 (buyer–seller ratio 1 : 5), it can be observed
that in a favorable e-market, EvEMDAs achieved slightly better
performance in SR, EU, NS, and CO as they negotiated in more
e-markets. However, the improvements were less significant
than in the unfavorable and balanced e-markets. This is because
in a favorable e-market, an EvEMDA is less likely to relax their
bargaining criteria to reach agreements.
8) Observation 2: EvEMDAs achieved better performance
in terms of SR, EU, NS, and CO than EMDAs.
From Fig. 8(a)–(d) (buyer–seller ratio 5 : 1), it can be seen
that the SR, EU, and CO of EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-1-10”
were clearly higher than those of EMDAs in “EMDA-1-10”
for different deadline ranges, and EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-1-
10” had clearly faster NS than EMDAs in “EMDA-1-10” for
all the deadline ranges. The results in Fig. 8(a)–(d) show that
EvEMDAs outperformed EMDAs in the first ten e-markets.
From Fig. 8(e)–(h) (buyer–seller ratio 5 : 1), it can be
observed that the SR, EU, and CO of EvEMDAs in “EvEMDA-
91-100” were clearly higher than those of EMDAs in “EMDA-
91-100” for different deadline ranges, and EvEMDAs in
“EvEMDA-91-100” had clearly faster NS than EMDAs in
“EMDA-91-100” for all the deadline ranges. Hence, the results
in Fig. 8(e)–(h) show that EvEMDAs outperformed EMDAs in
the last ten e-markets.
9) Results Summary: In summary, for very unfavorable,
unfavorable, balanced, and favorable e-markets, the results
in Figs. 4–7 show that EvEMDAs generally achieved better
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Fig. 8. Performance comparison between EvEMDAs and EMDAs (Buyer–seller ratio is 5 : 1).
performance as they evolved the relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules
and participated in negotiations in more e-markets (observa-
tion 1). The results in Fig. 8 show that EvEMDAs generally
achieved better performance than EMDAs both in the initial ten
e-markets and as they participated in negotiations in more
e-markets (observation 2).
VI. RELATED WORK
This section reviews and discusses state-of-the-art negoti-
ation agents that are designed with the flexibility to relax
their trading conditions using fuzzy approaches (e.g., fuzzy
constraint-based reasoning [29]–[33], fuzzy inference rules
[34], and FDCs [5], [6], [21], [22]).
Fuzzy e-Negotiation Agents (FeNAs) [29]–[31] are fuzzy
e-negotiation agents that adopt fuzzy constraint-based reason-
ing for bolstering multiissue negotiations. FeNAs negotiate
by exchanging offers, and a consensus is reached when their
private preferences, constraints, and objectives are satisfied.
One of the distinguishing features of FeNAs is that prefer-
ences, priorities, and constraints are defined as fuzzy constraints
(e.g., low price, high quality, short delivery time, and budget
about $90). FeNAs’s objectives may also be defined as soft
objectives (e.g., an agent prefers to pay $200 but is still happy
with paying a little bit more). In FeNAs, preferences, con-
straints and objectives are represented by membership functions
defining the degree of constraint satisfaction with possible
solutions or agreements. During negotiation, the set of fuzzy
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constraints prescribes a fuzzy set of each FeNA’s preferred
potential solutions (individual area of interest). The possible
joint solutions of negotiation (common interest area) are the
intersection of individual interest areas. FeNAs’ main goal is
to find the joint solution within a common area of interest that
maximizes the constraint satisfaction of the negotiating parties.
Lin et al. [32] and Lai and Lin [33] presented a problem-
solving framework that uses fuzzy constraints for modeling
multiissue multilateral negotiations for e-business agents. In
[32] and [33], negotiation is formulated as a distributed fuzzy
constraint satisfaction problem, which is represented as a set
of fuzzy constraint networks (FCNs) that are connected by
constraints. The objective is to determine whether a solution
exists that can satisfy a specified number of constraints. In
[32] and [33], each FCN is considered as an agent, and it
contains a set of objects (issues) and fuzzy constraints (e.g.,
“High Amount,” “Short Period”). Since an agent does not have
a precise estimate of other agents’ private information, each
agent takes turn to pass messages to other agents to explore
their information and search for a global solution. An order of
information exchanges and a leadership token are defined to
construct an interaction mechanism among the agents. In each
round of coordination, the coordinating agent holding the lead-
ership token first proposes its preferred solution according to
its concession strategy which decreases its previous aggregated
satisfaction value, or a tradeoff strategy to search for appropri-
ate proposals. The proposed solution will be evaluated by other
agents to determine whether it is satisfactory according to their
own degrees of satisfaction. If the solution does not satisfy the
constraints of any other agent, the coordinating agent passes the
token to the next agent according to the predefined order. Then,
the new coordinating agent will repeat the process of message
passing. The procedure continues until either a consensus is
reached or no other solution can be proposed. A consensus
is reached only when a solution satisfies all the agents. Both
[29]–[31] and [32], [33] modeled negotiation as a distributed
fuzzy constraint satisfaction problem. The general difference
is that while [29]–[31] deals with bilateral multiissue negotia-
tions, [32], [33] deals with multilateral multiissue negotiations.
Whereas [32] and [33] focused on finding a joint agreement that
satisfies all constraints and maximizes the agents’ aggregated
degree of satisfaction, this work adopts a set of fuzzy rules to
guide agents in relaxing their bargaining terms to enhance their
chances of reaching agreements and reaching agreements more
rapidly.
Wasfy and Hosni [35] introduced a model using a fuzzy logic
approach to represent the strategic profiles in the negotiation
process and to integrate several negotiation theories. In [35], a
two-party multiissue negotiation situation was considered and
simulated. Three moves were defined in their model: structural
moves (alternating offers and counteroffers), communicative
moves (attempt to change the negotiation power structure by
informing the opponent of either the truth/deception about the
preferences or intentions of the negotiator), and umpire moves
(force changes in the properties of the other negotiation entities
such as changing a negotiator’s power as time passes). During
negotiation, negotiators exchange communicative moves with
their opponents to alter specific properties of the negotiation
process. These properties are used to determine concessions
in structural moves. In addition, umpire moves may be used
to create time pressure on the negotiators by reducing their
power as time expires and by forcing a deadline for reaching
agreement. The process continues until an agreement is reached
or the time for negotiation expires. In [35], the strategic profiles
which represent a negotiator’s natural willingness and unwill-
ingness to concede are represented as a series of linear fuzzy
trapezoidal shapes. The negotiation power (such as legitimacy,
commitment, risk taking, time available) were also represented
as fuzzy values in their simulations. Whereas [35] modeled
negotiation power and (un)willingness to concede using fuzzy
concepts, this work uses a set of fuzzy rules to guide agents
in determining whether to reach agreements in multilateral
negotiations.
Wu et al. [36] presented a fuzzy negotiation model for bilat-
eral multiissue negotiations in e-commerce. Whereas this work
adopts an alternating protocol, [36] adopted the monotonic
concession protocols [1]. In [36], the acceptability for each
issue was represented by a fuzzy value and their membership
functions were normal distribution functions. The acceptability
of an offer is determined by the aggregated acceptability for
each of the issues with a weight assigned for each issue. A
critical value was defined for each negotiation. During ne-
gotiation, (counter-)offers were exchanged between the buyer
agent and the seller agent. When an agent’s acceptability for
its opponent’s offer exceeds or equals the critical value, the
negotiation ends with an agreement. Otherwise, the negotiator
generates a new (counter-)offer or exits the negotiation without
successfully completing a deal.
Closer to this work is the work of [34] that used fuzzy
inference rules for determining the acceptance of an opponent’s
offer. Wang et al. [34] used a set of manually generated fuzzy
rules for evaluating the incoming offer and the newly generated
offer. If the acceptance of the incoming offer is greater than
the acceptance of the (counter-)offer determined by the agent,
an agreement is reached. Otherwise, the agent sends a newly
generated offer to the opponent. However, if the acceptance
of the incoming offer is less than the minimum acceptance
of the agent, the incoming offer is rejected and negotiation
is terminated. The exchange continued until an agreement is
reached, or the maximum number of negotiation rounds or the
maximum duration of negotiation is reached. One of the main
differences between [34] and this work is that [34] adopted a
fixed manually designed set of fuzzy rules while an evolving
set of fuzzy rules is used in this paper. Furthermore, whereas
[34] focused on modeling multiissue, bilateral negotiations
involving a third-party-driven virtual marketplace, this work
adopts fuzzy rules for relaxing bargaining terms in multilateral
negotiations in which there is no third party mediation.
Meng and Fu [37] presented a negotiation model based on
a fuzzy multiple criteria decision-making method for multi-
issue negotiation problems. In [37], negotiators’ preferences
(weights) of issues and evaluations of issues were represented
as fuzzy variables with trapezoidal membership functions.
Fuzzy linear weighted arithmetic average was used to obtain
fuzzy evaluation of negotiators. Hamming gap is adopted to
compute the similarity degree between the negotiation proposal
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and the ideal solution or the negative-ideal solution. A nego-
tiator’s satisfaction degree with the negotiation proposal was
computed by the similarity degree between the proposal and the
ideal solution and the similarity degree between the proposal
and the negative-ideal solution. If all negotiators’ satisfaction
degrees are not less than the threshold of the satisfaction de-
grees, an agreement is reached and the negotiation is completed.
Otherwise, the negotiators modify their proposals according
to their evaluations, and negotiation continues until either an
agreement is reached or the maximum number of sessions has
been reached.
Sim and Wang [21] enhanced the design of MDAs
(Section II) using a set of manually generated fuzzy rules to
determine when they should relax their bargaining terms in
the hope of having a higher chance of reaching a consensus.
Augmented with an FDC [21], Sim’s enhanced MDA (EMDAs)
are programmed to slightly relax their bargaining terms in the
face of intense pressure (e.g., urgent need to acquire a resource,
or facing fast approaching deadlines). Since notions such as
“very slight” difference in proposals, “strong” competition, and
“fast” approaching deadline are vague, an FDC together with
a set of 16 fuzzy rules were used in [21] to guide EMDAs in
making decision when relaxing their aspirations. In relaxing its
bargaining terms, an EMDA is influenced by factors such as
degree of competition (ϑ), and its eagerness (ε). ε represents
how urgent it is for an EMDA to acquire a resource before
a deadline [21] and ε = 1/λ, because an EMDA that is more
(respectively, less) eager to reach a consensus will adopt a
strategy with a smaller (respectively, larger) value of λ. Both ϑ
and ε form the antecedents of the fuzzy rules while the amount
of relaxation η is the consequent. Whereas ϑ and ε are the inputs
to the FDC, η represents the amount that an EMDA would
relax its bargaining terms in a given situation (the output of
the FDC). This work differs significantly from [21] in the fol-
lowing ways.
1) Whereas the set of 16 fuzzy rules in [21] was generated
manually, the set of 27 fuzzy rules in this paper is evolved
to improve the performance of agents as they negotiate in
more e-markets.
2) While two relaxation criteria degree of competition (ϑ)
and eagerness (ε) were used in [21], three relaxation
criteria a) degree of competition (ϑ), b) time pressure
(Tr), and c) the relative distances from trading parties’
proposals (δ) are used in this work.
Since an agent that is more (respectively, less) urgently
in need to acquire a resource before a deadline would have
selected a strategy with a smaller (respectively, larger) value
of λ, in this work, the author prefers to replace ε with two
relaxation criteria: time pressure and distances from trading
parties. Time pressure is a more crucial factor when an agent
considers whether to relax its bargaining terms because an agent
has to complete negotiation before its deadline to successfully
acquire a resource. Considering the distances between the pro-
posal of an agent and all the proposals of its trading parties
is essential because if its own proposal is relatively close to a
trading party’s proposal and relatively far from proposals of all
other trading parties, it seems prudent for an agent to relax its
bargaining terms to reach an agreement more rapidly rather than
to continue with the negotiation.
The work in [21] was subsequently adapted to auto-
mated negotiation in grid resource management. In Sim’s
relaxed-criteria G-negotiation protocol [5], [6], market-driven
G-negotiation agents representing resource providers and con-
sumers are programmed to slightly relax their bargaining cri-
teria under intense pressure (e.g., when a consumer has a
higher demand for resources) with the hope of enhancing their
chance of successfully acquiring resources. A consumer agent
and a provider agent are both designed with an FDC: FDC-C
and FDC-P, respectively. Two sets of relaxation criteria (for
consumers and providers, respectively) that are specific to grid
resource management are used as inputs to FDC-C and FDC-P,
respectively.
Two criteria that can influence a consumer agent’s decision
in the amount of relaxation of bargaining terms are: 1) recent
statistics in failing/succeeding in acquiring resources called
failure to success ratio (fst) and 2) demand for computing
resources called demand factor (dft). If a consumer agent is
less successful in acquiring resources recently to execute its
set of tasks, it will be under more pressure to slightly relax
its bargaining criteria with the hope of completing a deal.
Furthermore, if it has a greater demand for computing resources
it is more likely to be under more pressure to slightly relax
its bargaining criteria. Both fst and dft are inputs to FDC-C,
which a consumer agent uses to determine η (its amount of
relaxation) [5], [6].
Two criteria that can influence a provider agent’s decision
are: 1) the amount of the provider’s resource(s) being utilized
(i.e., the utilization level (ult)) and 2) recent requests from
consumers for resources (i.e., called the request factor
(rft)). If more of its resources are currently being used to
execute its own tasks or have already been leased to other
consumers, then a provider is less likely to slightly relax its
bargaining terms. If there are fewer recent demands from
consumers to lease its resources, a provider is more likely
to slightly relax its bargaining criteria since it is under more
pressure to trade its idle resources. Both ult and rft are
inputs to FDC-P, which a provider agent uses to determine
η [5], [6].
Unlike the two sets of fuzzy rules for FDC-C and FDC-P in
[5] and [6] that were manually generated, the fuzzy rules in this
work are evolved as agents negotiate in more e-markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
The novelty and significance of this work are that (to the best
of the author’s knowledge) it is one of the earliest works that
design negotiation agents that not only use fuzzy rules to relax
bargaining criteria, but also evolve new relaxed-criteria fuzzy
rules to improve their negotiation outcomes as they participate
in negotiations in more e-markets.
The contributions of this work are detailed as follows.
1) Compared with other related works discussed in
Section VI that adopt fuzzy approaches for building nego-
tiation agents, this work (to the best of the author’s knowl-
edge) is the earliest work that adopts an evolutionary
SIM: EVOLVING FUZZY RULES FOR RELAXED-CRITERIA NEGOTIATION 1499
fuzzy approach for constructing adaptive and self-
improving negotiation agents operating in a series of
e-markets.
2) An evolutionary algorithm for adapting and evolving
relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules was developed. Using the
negotiation outcomes of agents in each e-market as data
sets, the algorithm learns effective relaxed-criteria nego-
tiation rules that would potentially enhance the perfor-
mance of MDAs as they negotiate in subsequent markets.
3) A new FDC was designed and implemented with the
following novel features.
a) A new set of relaxation criteria was formulated, and
the criteria time pressure (Tr) and the relative dis-
tances from trading parties’ proposals (δ) were used
in place of eagerness (ε) in [21].
b) While the FDC in [21] has two inputs and consults
a rule base with 16 fuzzy rules, the new FDC in this
paper has three inputs and consults a rule base with 27
fuzzy rules.
c) More importantly, while the set of 16 fuzzy rules
in [21] was constructed manually and used through-
out the entire life-span of agents in [21], the set of
27 fuzzy rules in this work is evolved to improve
the performance of agents as they negotiate in more
e-markets.
4) A testbed to demonstrate the effectiveness of evolving
relaxed-criteria fuzzy rules of negotiations was devel-
oped. Whereas previous testbeds in [5], [6], and [21]
consisted of only MDAs and EMDAs, the testbed in this
paper is used to compare the performance of EvEMDAs
with EMDAs (see Section V).
5) Empirical results (Section V) show that: a) EvEMDAs
generally outperformed EMDAs in terms of SR, EU,
NS, and CO and b) the negotiation outcomes of EvEM-
DAs generally improved as they negotiated in more e-
markets. These results provide evidence to show that
evolutionary fuzzy approaches are appropriate paradigms
for designing adaptive and self-improving negotiation
agents operating in a series of e-markets. It is reminded
that whereas SR and EU were used as performance
measures for comparing MDAs and EMDAs in only
one e-market in [21], the experiments in this paper
compared the performance of EvEMDAs and EMDAs
in terms of SR, EU, NS, and CO in a series of 100
e-markets.
Finally, the author acknowledges that although this work
adopts an evolutionary fuzzy approach for developing agents
in multilateral single-issue negotiations, in its present form,
this paper does not deal with multiissue negotiations like some
of the related work (e.g., [29]–[37]) discussed in Section VI.
Hence, extending this work to include multiissue negotia-
tions, perhaps, by adopting some of the techniques of fuzzy
constraint-based reasoning in [29]–[33] is among the list of
agendas for future work. Additionally, in its present form, the
fuzzy membership functions in this paper are predetermined
and fixed for the fuzzy variables. Other possible enhancements
of this work may include 1) automatic and dynamic tuning of
the membership functions by GAs and 2) adopting trapezoidal
membership functions (rather than those in Fig. 1) for assigning
memberships to the linguistic terms (L, M, and H).
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